Daulay, M. H., Soraya, E., Ha, T. T. T., Laraswati, D., Susanti, F. D., Sahide, M. A. K., & Maryudi, A. (2024). Implementation of Timber Legality Assurance and Licensing Systems in Vietnam: A SWOT-AHP Analysis. Journal of Sustainable Forestry, 43(1–5), 54–70. https://doi.org/10.1080/10549811.2024.2439618
Abstract
The European Union (EU) established cooperation with timber exporting countries to fight illegal logging through the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan. FLEGT has gained increasing interest from several countries, including Vietnam, which has signed a bilateral Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the EU. Central to the VPA is the implementation of a timber legality assurance system (TLAS) that ensures that only legal products are exported to the EU. Employing Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats – Analytic Hierarchy Process (SWOT-AHP) analysis, this paper identifies key factors that support or constrain TLAS implementation in Vietnam and ranks them based on their respective importance. The government might be persuaded to implement TLAS given the growing trends in timber legality policy in its main export destinations amidst the increasing environmental campaigns against trade in illegal timber. TLAS implementation is potentially enabled by the strong political commitment that has been translated into key programs dedicated to tackling illegal logging. However, our analysis shows that the potential adverse impacts of TLAS implementation on the timber sector could be one of the determining factors considering the high contribution of the sector to the national economy. Overall, our analysis points out that Vietnam is not completely ready to implement its TLAS in the foreseeable future.
Ismariana, E., Kusuma, A. F., Permadi, D. B., Kartodihardjo, H., Santoso, W. B., & Maryudi, A. (2024). Corruption in Social Forestry in Indonesia. Forest and Society, 8(2), 443–463. https://doi.org/10.24259/fs.v8i2.34782
Abstract
Social forestry is envisioned as a governance reform to empower rural communities to improve both the forest condition and their quality of life. In Indonesia, however, its implementation has been plagued by a number of governance-related issues including corrupt practices among various actors. Drawing on programs implemented in Java, we delve into the types and mechanisms by which corruption has occurred (or occurs) in various social forestry activities. Tracking experience across several phases of social forestry, the corrupt practices were initially performed among the field foresters and the higher hierarchies. These corrupt practices were later imitated by other actors, who increasingly considered them as normal and acceptable practices. In contemporary social forestry programs, corruption is conducted by diverse stakeholders, including smallholder farmers, public officials and other authorities among the bureaucracy, as well as nongovernment organizations. Corruption has significant bearing on policy initiatives and programmatic outcomes, as it inhibits the implementation of formal rules and norms of social forestry. Our historical tracing provides better insights into why corruption is not only a social forestry-related challenge but also a part of a larger societal problem as it has been normalized and deepened over decades.
Sirimorok, N., Sahide, M. A. K., Herrawan, H., Faturachmat, F., & Maryudi, A. (2024). Linking commoning with social forestry: An Indonesian case. Trees, Forests and People, 18, 100737. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.TFP.2024.100737
Abstract
Social forestry schemes aimed at both conservation and land redistribution for smallholders surrounding the Indonesian state forests. However, the results so far are mixed at best, with limited areas having been granted to the intended beneficiary groups. Several problems appear to be the causes. They range from the domination of administrative and managerial aspects of the scheme, lack of decision-making participation of the intended beneficiaries, to the program granting marginal land and/or located far from the smallholder villages. Consequently, smallholders are unenthusiastic about the schemes, conflict ensuing at the local level, and the marginalized groups are excluded from accessing the schemes. Focusing on a case from two smallholder groups granted with a Community Forestry scheme in a South Sulawesi village, we delve into the ways in which, and the extent to which, the smallholders are actually able to access the social forestry program. Exploring the case through the commoning perspective we examine the unique ways in which the local smallholder groups create specific social relations and governing institutions, through the practice of commoning, that enable them to effectively benefitting from the scheme. We found that through commoning the groups create their own collective local rules, as well as activating informal relations, they were able to develop effective collective management of their plots–that are treated as individual-holding in most other similar groups. These successes hinge on their ability to develop and maintain the commoning practice, utilizing deep local knowledge, and unique historical context around Indonesian social forestry. The case presents a unique way in which smallholders are muddling through the red tapes of formal rules in order to make a successful story that the state scheme intended to achieve.