Rahayu, S., Laraswati, D., Pratama, A. A., Sahide, M. A., Permadi, D. B., Wibowo, W., … & Maryudi, A. 2020. Bureaucratizing non-government organizations as governmental forest extension services in social forestry policy in Indonesia. Forests, Trees and Livelihoods, 29(2), 119-129. doi.org/10.1080/14728028.2020.1753585
Abstract
The government of Indonesia is ambitiously planning for more expansion of social forestry with a target of 12.7 million ha of state land to be distributed to local communities through several permit-based social forestry schemes. To deliver the target, the central forest bureaucracy issued a new forest extension policy, which enables non-government organizations (NGOs) to get involved in government extension services. This short commentary analyses aspects related to the coordination and synergies between government agencies and NGOs to achieve their common goals in extension activities. NGOs possess strengths as an agent of community development programs with technical and organizational expertise and experience in mobilizing communities. However, given their contrasted characteristics in terms of organizational settings, goals and objectives, there are challenges facing NGOs when partnering with government institutions. They may face rigid and demanding bureaucratic procedures, and complex coordination.
Myers, R., Rutt, R. L., McDermott, C., Maryudi, A., Acheampong, E., Camargo, M., & Cầm, H. 2020. Imposing legality: hegemony and resistance under the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade (FLEGT) initiative. Journal of Political Ecology, 27(1), 125-149.
Abstract
Timber legality trade restrictions and verification are a bundle of contemporary mechanisms triggered by global concerns about forest degradation and deforestation. The European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade initiative is a significant effort to not only screen out illegal timber and wood products from the EU, but also support trading partner countries to improve their legality definitions and verification processes. But by using bilateral agreements (Voluntary Partnership Agreements) as a key mechanism, the EU legitimizes trade partner nation-states as the authority to decide what is legal. We engage in a theoretical debate about the complexities of the meaning of legality, and then analyze empirical data collected from interviews in Ghana, Indonesia, Vietnam and Europe with policy, civil society and industry actors to understand how different actors understand legality. We find hegemonic notions of Westphalian statehood at the core of ‘global’ notions of legality and often contrast with local understandings of legality. Non-state actors understand these hegemonic notions of legality as imposed upon them and part of a colonial legacy. Further, notions of legality that fail to conform with hegemonic understandings are readily framed by nation-states as immoral or criminal. We emphasize the importance of understanding these framings to elucidate the embedded assumptions about what comprises legality within assemblages of global actors.
Maryudi, A., Acheampong, E., Rutt, R. L., Myers, R., & McDermott, C. L. 2020. “A Level Playing Field”?–What an Environmental Justice Lens Can Tell us about Who Gets Leveled in the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan. Society & Natural Resources, 33(7), 859-875. doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2020.1725201
Abstract
The European Union introduced Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan, with Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPA) and the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR) as the key components. The VPA and EUTR have been conceived as complementary tools to establish a “level playing field.” This paper analyses how a level playing field has been conceptualized, approached, and experienced in practice. It focuses on the adoption and implementation of EUTR and VPA in Europe, Indonesia, and Ghana. Our research highlights inequities in the practice of “leveling” and outcomes from a presumed level field. Stakeholder engagement excluded some factions of the private sector, notably SME operators, favoring select NGOs in general. New systems also favor larger operators who possess more capacity to deal with legality requirements. This leads small operators to perceive of a so-called level playing field as one in which they are disadvantaged, indicating multiple injustices against already vulnerable groups.